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ENGLANDS APPEAL
FROM THE

Private Cabal

AT
WHITE-HALL
TO

The Great Council of the Nation,
THE LORDS and COMMONS

IN
Parliament
ASSEMBLED.

By a true Lover of his Country.

Anno 1673.

Phædrus Lib 1. Fab. V.


*Nunquam est fidelis cum potente societas.
Testatur hæc fabula Propositi:um meum.*


Vacca & Capella & patiens Ovis injurice,
Socij fuere cum Leone in sa'tibus.
Hi cum cepissent Cervum vasti corporis,
Sic est Locutus, partibus factis, Leo:
Ego primam tollo, nominor quia Leo:
Secundum, quia sum fortis tribuetis mihi.
Tum quia plus valeo, me sequetur tertia,
Malo adficietur, si quis quartam tetigerit.
Sic totam prædam Sola Improbitas abstulit.

Anglice,

ENg'and this fable plainly shew's,
A strong Allie no Partner know's

THe BULL, the GOAT, and patient SHEEP one day,
Leagu'd with the LION, sought a Common prey;
'A Prey they took, an high and mighty Hart;
Of which each thought to have his equal part:
Soft, quoth the LION, I the first share claim,
'Cause LION King oth' Forrest is my name;
The second you shall give me as my due,
'Cause I am valiant, able to subdue:
The third I take by force, and for the rest
Touch it who dares; yield it all, you had best.





THis is an Age of wonders : And if with a considering eye we take a careful view of *Europe*, we shall find that some years last past have presented us with as many things worthy of admiration as any former age hath afforded to our forefathers. The Revolution of *Portugal*, and the wonderful secrecy with which it was carried on, is not to be matched in any Age. The Tragy-Comedy of *Massanello* looks more like a Poetical fiction then a real Truth. The Deposing of Kings, and (which is much more strange) their Voluntary resignation (of which the Anna's of Ancient times furnish us, but with very few Examples) are become the common Theame of our Journals, and if from the rest of *Europe* we turn our eyes towards this Island, our surprisal will increase, and we shall find that this little British VWorld is a small Enchiridon or Epitome of all the stupendious events that ever hapned in the great one. VVe have all seen or had a share in those passages which Posterity will hardly give more credit to, then we do to what is said of King *Arthurs* Round Table. And 'tis not improbable that some hundred years hence the History of our late Revolutions will be ranked among the fabulous Romances of *Gildas*, and such other VVriters.

But it may be among all our unexpected changes, Revolutions and Counsels, there is scarce any more justly to be wondred at, then the present alliance with *France*, and the VVar we have undertaken, and do still persist to prosecute against *Holland*, in so dangerous an association with the *French*. It was undoubtedly above the reach of an ordinary understanding to imagine or suspect (in the least) that a Protestant Kingdom, without being compelled to it by some urgent and unavoidable necessity, should ever fight with so much fierceness for the destruction of the Protestant interest : or that English Counsellors should advise his Majesty to run the fortune of a *French* King without a rational Prospect of advantage to himself. VVould any man that judgeth of things

things according to the ordinary rules of prudence, have thought that in order to the making good our Title to the Kingdom of *France*, we should able their present King to invade all Christendom, and to extend his Empire without bounds, or that to secure to our selves the sovereignty of the Seas, we should with so much industry endeavour to force all the *Dutch Ships*, with all their Naval Power into the *French Arms*; and rejoyce at their Victories, as if by Conquering the Land, they did not Master at the same time their Havens, their Rivers, and their Fleets? VVe have been often told of brisk messengers sent formerly to the *French Kings*, as soon as they did but lay the Carcase of some pitiful Ship upon the stocks. But we did never so much as dream that Vice Admirals, and other considerable Sea Officers should be sent to the *French Court* to encourage and promote the setting out of their Fleets: That pitying their want of experience in Sea Affairs, we would out of Compassionate and Brotherly love lead their raw Sea-men by the hand, Train them up in our Fleets, and amongst the best of our Sea-men, teach them what Skill we have learnt in a long and dear bought experience. And to Crown all, even fight for them, and interpose between them and danger with so good success (as it proved) that the *French Squadron* (as if the Engagement had been only designed for an entertainment and diversion to them) came off as fresh and as whole as when they first sailed out of their Ports. The surprizing novelty and strangeness of these unexpected Councils hath occasioned the following reflections. And all men being equally concerned in the preservation of the Ship they Sayl in, though all do not sit at the Helm, it is every ones duty as well as their undoubted right to prevent as much as they are able, a fatal running up n Rocks, which may chance not to be discerned by others, upon this just and well grounded confidence, I presume to direct these Papers to the great Counsel of the Nation, humbly begging that they be read with an unbyassed mind, and truth weighed in the balance of the Sanctuary. Before all I must promise I do not intend to write an Apology for the *Dutch*, nor to justify all their proceedings, much less to encrease the number of the scurrilous Pamphlets against them, which I am confident will affect no sober man in the Nation, and need only to be read to be confuted. I'll only say that since all Christians should above all things inquire into the justice of their Arms before they undertake them up, or refuse to lay them down. It will become the wisdom and prudence of both houses to hear what the *Dutch* may

may say for themselves, and to take into their serious consideration the protestations they make both in publick and in private, of their unfeigned desires as well as readiness to give *England* all possible satisfaction, and buy his Majesties Friendship at a more then ordinary Rate.

But my present design being not to enter further into these particulars, not to examine the Justice or Injustice of this War, but rather to consider and quere (supposing it had been never so just at first) how far it may be advisible to continue it, I will with as much clearness as I am able, and in as few words as the matter will bear, confine my self to these following Heads.

1. *A short Account of the Crown with which his Majesty is entered into League.*

2. *The necessity and unavoidable Consequence of this War.*

3. *Some general reflections upon the whole, with some Account of the manner and steps by which this War was both promoted and begun.*

1. All those who are not altogether Strangers to the VWorld will easily grant that of all the Kingdoms of Europe there are none but may be said inferiour to *France* in some respect or other, and to want some advantages which *France* enjoyeth in a very eminent degree, The greatness of its Territories, the Populousness of it, the number of their Gentry and Nobility. Their natural courage; together with the advantage of being Trained up either to Military Actions, or to VVarlike Exercises, ever since the Foundation of their Monarchy, the Situation of their Country, and the Opportunities they have by it to annoy their Neighbours upon all occasions. The fruitfulness and riches of the Soyle, together with the prodigious quantity of all sorts of Commodities, manufactured and unmanufactured, with which they supply their Neighbours. And lastly, the great Revenues of their Kings, who governing of late without controule or check, are so much the more able to oppress their Neighbours: All these Advantages meeting together, they have in all Ages had aspiring thoughts, and under *Charlemain* had Erected a new Western Empire, which in a likelihood would have proved of longer continuation, had not those great Dominions been shared and divided between the said *Charlemains* Children, which in the succeeding Ages proved an occasion of many great and bloody VVars.

2. A second and memorabl^s stop to the encrease of the *French*, was, when by the ambition of *Hugh Capet*, who aimed at the Crown, to usurp it with less opposition, and to draw the *Grande*s into his party, he made all their Governments hereditary, and Erected them into a kind of Principallities held in *Capite*, from thence sprang so many great Families able afterwards to wage VVar against the *French* King. And whilst they were thus in a kind of Minority, the House of *Burgundy* having joyned with *England*, brought that Kingdom to the Low condition, every one knows.

Lewis the 11th, was the first who after the *English* had lost not only their new Conquest, but also what they had possessed of old in *France*, raised the *French* Crown to a greater height, and his Son *Charles* the 8th, besides the Acquisition of *Brittany*, frighted all *Europe* by his surprising Conquest of the Kingdom of *Naples*.


This occasioned a general Confederacy of all Neighbouring Princes against him, whereby he soon lost what he had gotten. But still the ambitious thoughts of his Successors would have much endangered the Liberty of *Europe*, if the *Austrian* Family (raised on a sudden to a vast Grandeur by the occasion of an innumerable number of Provinces united in *Charles* the 5th.) had not carried the Imperial Crown from *Francis* the 1st. who stood with much Eagerness for it, and had already engaged several of the Electors.


This having over ballanced the *French* power, the said *Francis* the 1st. though helped several times by the great *Solyman* Emperor of the *Turks*, was at last forced to yield to the Victorious Arms of *Charles* the 5th, who took him Prisoner and forced him to buy his Liberty with a very disadvantageous peace.

But his Son *Henry* the second had better success; and amongst other Advantages, he added to his Dominions three very fair Imperial and Episcopal Towns, and was like'y to have gone further had he not been prevented by a sudden death, *England* all this while (true at that time to their own Interest) with a skilful Hand holding the Ballance, and keeping the contesting Parties in as great an equality, as their own occasions would permit.

Under the minority of his Children, the Bloody Massacres and Civil VVars began, which lasted forty years, and would have put an end to that Monarchy if the Ambition of *Philip* the second would have given way to the dividing of it into the several Principalities, which the respective *Grande*s aimed at.

Buc





But *Henry* the 4th strengthened by the divisions which grew between the *Spaniards* and the holy League, having won many Battles, made his Title to the Crown good, by the success of his Arms and not long after concluded peace with *Spain* to gain time to breath, and to recover new strength.

No sooner was he at rest but he bent all his thoughts upon a new project as vast in the design of it as Extraordinary in its nature, intending no less then to cast *Europe* into a new mould & to reduce all the Kingdoms and Common Wealths. that were in his time to a certain number, and to bring them within such bounds as he should prescribe to them, being sure however in this marshalling to take such share to himself as would have enabled him (or at least his Successors) to grow into a universal monarch.

To effect this he had already made choice of his Generals and other great Officers, and was preparing both Arms and money when a sudden and unexpected death puts an end as well to his undertaking as to his Life.

The beginning, and in truth the greatest part of the Reign of *Lewis* the 13th. his Son was much disturbed by intestine broils and Civil Wars, during which the house of *Austria* was very near bringing all *Germany* under their subjection and after the Battle of *Prague* stood very fair for the universal Empire. But *France* having at last quieted all at home, did (under pretence of opposing the *Austrian* Family and whilst they were courted by several Princes to assist and protect them against the Emperour) vastly increased their own power, & conquered new Provinces, and considerable Towns in *Spain*, *Italy*, *Germany* and the *Low Countries*; which raising new jealousy in their own Allies occasioned the peace of *Munster* to prevent their further progress.

About the same time the new Civil wars which broke out in *France* under the minority of the present King, gave opportunity to *Spain* to recover part of their Losses, till the (late) Protector of *England* joining with the *French* (for the advancement of some private ends of his own, and by a policy from which the destruction of *Europe* may chance to take its date before we are much older) brought them into a decaying condition and made the *Pyrenian* Peace (after the death of *Cromwell*) most welcome to them.

Before we go further and come to give a more particular account of

the present *French* Court, I will beg leave to stop here a while, and desire the Reader to take along the following inferences, from what hath already been hinted, amore full knowledge thereof being left to the perusal of their Histories.

1. That no greater proofs can be given of the internal strength of the *French* Nation, then their overcoming the many dangerous convulsions of state, they have from time to time struggled, with which in all appearance would have destroyed any other Nation.

2. That in all Ages, as soon as their intestine troubles have been over, they have still out of a restless Warlike humour endeavoured to encroach upon their neighbours, and to encrease their own Dominions, laying hold of all opportunities to disturb mankind, and having never been able as yet to set bounds to their Ambition.

3. But this Ambitious humour of theirs, supported by the greatness of their power would long before this time have brought all *Europ* under their Subjection, if their own division and private quarrels had not from time to time, put back their designs for many years, or their greatest Princes been cut off before they could finish their intended work.

4. And Lastly as a consequence of the three former, that it was ever, and will be still; the true interest of *Europe* to oppose the *French* designs, or if there be occasion of making use of them against some other opposers, not to accept of their assistance, longer or further then publick utility requires it, nor to suffer them to proceed after the danger is over, as it was practiced in the peace of *Passaw*, in the time of *Henry* the 2. and that of *Munster*, in both which the *French* were stopped in their full carreere by their own Allies, though they still came off with profit.

The *French* having thus in the last Wars, added many fair Provinces and Towns to their Territories, this present Court had no sooner made peace with *Spain*, but they thought of laying the foundations of a vaster Empire then ever. And perceiving that since the discovery of the *Indies*, and increase of Trade, Naval strength was the most important of all others and Navigation and commerce the greatest (if not the only) supporters of it. They first erected and encouraged several Trading Companies; and in the second place they spared no cost & stuck at no charge or expence, to purchase a considerable Fleet of men of War where in they have been so successful. That I fear their Fleet

Fleet (excepting the true courage of our Seamen) is not much inferior to that of His Majesties as incredible as it may seem at first, considering how few years they have applied themselves to it.

But whilst they were thus intent upon the increase of their interest at Sea, they let no opportunity slip, of enlarging their Empire at Land for during the late War with *Holland*, they invaded in (1667) and mastered a considerable part of the *Spanish Low Countries* in 1669 they hunted the poor Duke of *Lorraine* out of his Dutchy, and to this day possess it all, and now this last year they have conquered the half the United Provinces, much less then all this was more then sufficient to awaken all *Europe*; and His Majesty above all others being out of his Private wisdom very sensible that the true keeping a ballance between the Princes and other States of *Europe*, was the only security of all, and that by a timely stop to the *French* Conquests he would reap an infinite Honour and Profit. As soon as the *French* King fell upon *Flanders* he begun to think of applying fit Remedies to so dangerous a Disease, and having concluded a peace at *Breda* with the *Hollanders* he sent them in private in *January* 1668. Sir *William Temple*, who was then Resident at *Brussels*, to propose a nearer Alliance with them, and to take joyn't measures against the *French*.

" No small Argument by the way, of His Majesties aversion to the *French* designs, and of the fear he had of their increase, since to prevent it, he went so far as to seek the *Hollanders* first, and to propose stricter Alliances with them after so fierce and Recent a War ended with the unpleasant circumstances of *Chatham*.

Sir *William Temple*'s Proposals having been entertained with all ready compliance by the *Dutch*, he waited on his Majesty to give him an account of his Negotiation, and within five days after he was sent back to the *Hague* with all necessary powers and instructions, by virtue of and in conformity to which he concluded and agreed upon, two several Treaties with the *Dutch*, the one a defensive & stricter League than before between the two Nations; and the other a joyn't and reciprocal Engagement, to oppose the conquest of *Flanders*, & to procure either by way of Mediation or by force of arms, speedy peace between *France* & *Spain*, upon the Terms therein mentioned & because *Sweden* came unto the same Treaty very little after, from the three Parties

concerned and engaged it was called the Triple League. In pursuance of this the Treaty of *Aix la Chapel* was forced upon the *French* & in some manner upon the *Spaniards*, who were very unwilling to give away by a solemn Treaty so great a part of their Country. But both his Majesty and the *Hollanders* thought it a very great and good work, & judged it a great happiness not only for *Spain*, but for all *Europe* to come off with a broken Pate, and to have at least for that while kept *France* from going further.

This represented to the Parliament with all the advantages of Language and nothing omitted in the respective Speeches of his Majesty himself, the Lord Keeper, and many private Members, that could make both Houses (and with them the whole Kingdom) sensible of the great Service done to *England*, and in a manner to all mankind, by chaining up a devouring *Lion*, who was never satiated with prey.

This Triple League grew so famous that it proved the politick Institute of our *Justinian*. In the name of the Triple League, and of the Treaty of *Aix la Chapel*, several subsidies were both demanded and granted, for 2 or 3 Sessions together the Triple League stopped or annulled all Impeachments: for its sake Inquiries into Mis-carriages were laid aside. And the Parliament did conceive they could neither give nor forgive too much, if by their compliance they could but contribute some what towards binding the *French* to their good behaviour.

Besides this to tie the Knot faster, and take even the very thoughts from the *French King* of ever stirring or being troublesome to his neighbours, his Majesty sent an Extraordinary Envoy to several Princes of *Germany*, to invite them into a Triple League: His Minister to persuade them to it, laying open with no less heat than plainness the danger all *Europe* was in. The insensibility of most Princes, and their carelessness, the watchful ambition of the *French*, the greatness of their Forces, and the little reason one had to trust them. In fine, omitting nothing that could Alarm all the world, and procure a general confederacy against the common Oppressor. Nay, to evince and demonstrate (besides all we said now) that this Triple League was not entered into out of a particular respect, or personal kindness to the *Spaniard* (not to speak now of the misunderstanding and Jarring between *England* and *Spain* in the *West Indies*) the *Spaniards* being very much wanting to themselves, by their backwardness in the payment of the Subsidies promised to *Sweden*. His Majesty not to be wanting to
Europe.

Europe and consequently to his own Kingdoms out of the deep sense he had of the necessity of preserving the Triple-League entire, & being not without fears, the *Swedes* might fall off unless the Money agreed upon was paid them, without further delay; he offered in *September* or *October* 1668. to advance himself part of it, and had accordingly done it in case the *Dutch* would have advanced the rest.

All this doth abundantly shew what opinion his Majesty and his Council were used to have of *France* as well as both Houses, and the rest of the Nation: And therefore without considering how things came to be altered (which we may take hereafter some notice of) we may lay down as an Undeniable *English* Principle, and a maxim never to be overruled from: That *France* is no ways to be suffered to grow great much less to have their designs promoted, as it is plain to all mankind they are now

But we must go somewhat further, and there being nothing more dangerous then to joyn in any ambitious design with a Prince against whom we can no ways secure our selves, in case he break his word to us, it will not be amiss to consider how far one may rely upon the Candor and integrity of the *French Court*, and what may rationally be expected from their generosity.

In Order to this, since the heart of man is not known otherwise then by a careful observation of their *Actions*, and that we cannot judge of things to come but by Inferences and *Arguments* drawn from those that are past; the best way to satisfy our selves is to take a short survey of the carriage and conduct of the *French Court* for these last 13 Years, during which they have had still the same ministers, who are not like to Act henceforth upon any other Principles, or by other methods then they have done hitherto, and they having been brought up in so good a School as that of *Cardinal Mazarin* whose motto was that an honest man ought not to be a slave to his word, it must not be wondred at, if they do still as much as they are able; influence their present master and endeavour to persuade him that.

Si Violandum est jus, Regnandi causa Violandum est.

The first proof of the honesty both of the *Cardinal* himself, and of his *Disciples*, is their carriage in the *Pirenean Treaty* & their performance of what was most Essential in it, wherein is to be observed that.

By the endeavours of the *Queen Mother of France*, a peace being promoted between the two Crowns, with a marriage between the
French

French King and the Infanta of Spain, the whole Treaty was grounded upon two considerable points, which till granted by *France*, had still hindered the conclusion of that great work. the one, was the forsaking of *Portugal* and the other a renunciation of the *Infanta*, (consented to and ratified by the *French King*) of all her present and future Pretences, Titles or Claims whatsoever to the *Spanish Monarchy* and *Dominions* thereof, or to any part of the same: *Left*, saith the Treaty, *The Glory of their respective Kingdoms should come to decay, and be diminished if by reason and through the said Marriage they came to be united and joyned, in any of their Children and Posterity, which would occasion to the Subjects and Vassals, such troubles and afflictions as might easily be imagined.*

As to the first, viz. the exclusion and forsaking of *Portugal*. The words of the Treaty are these. *His said Majesty (the French King) will interm dale no further in the said Business, and doth promise, and oblige himself upon his honour, and upon the faith and word of a King, both for himself and his successors, not to give, neither in common nor to any Person or Persons thereof in Particular of what Dignity, Estate or Condition soever, either at present or for the future, any help or assistance, neither publick or secret, directly nor indirectly of Men, Arms, Munitions, Vessels, nor Money, under any pretence, nor any other thing whatsoever by Land or by Sea, nor in any other manner, as likewise not to suffer any Levies to be made in any part of his Kingdoms, and Dominions nor to grant a passage to any that might come from other Countries to the Relief of the said Kingdom of Portugal.*

I suppose all the World will grant, it were hard for the wit of man to find out, or so much as imagine stronger words, or fuller expressions in a Treaty to prevent what the Spaniards were so much afraid of, viz. the Assistance of *Portugal*, Let us now see how it was performed.

As soon as this was agreed on, & before the Treaty was signed Cardinal *Mazarin* (still resolved as well in this as upon all other occasions, not to be (*Esclave De sa parole*) sent privately the Marquis the *Cheupes* into *Portugal*, to assure them that in Order to the conclusion of the Treaty then on foot with *Spain*, they were forced to leave them out, and to engage not to assist them: but that whatever they promised they would never forsake them, and would still

Still protect them against *Spain* as much as they had done before. The truth is, they kept their word to *Portugal* much better than they did to *Spain*. And the Peace was no sooner made, but they sent them the usual supplies of Men, Arms and Money, And a while after notwithstanding their former Treaty with *Spain*, and in the view of the whole world they entered into an Offensive League with that Kingdom against all their Enemies, whereby among other things the *French* were to have all the Sea-Towns that should be taken from *Spain* delivered to them. All which with many other particulars, too long to be inserted in this short discourse, may be seen more at large in the incomparable Books of the *Baron de Jffola*; intituled the *Bucler* of State and Justice which to this day could not be answered by the *French* though often challenged (and so much concerned in honor) to do it.

The other security of the *Pirenian* Treaty as to *Spain*, and that without which they could never have given their consent to their Marriage of the *Infanta*, was the Renunciation before mentioned, And whoever reads it will be apt to think, a General Council of the *Crislans* was called, to outdo all former Expressions used in such contracts, and to find out new binding Clauses, to take of all possibility of Evasion. And to make it more sacred yet and more inviolable; There being no greater tie upon Sovereign Princes than that of Publick and Solemn Treaties, the Act of the Renunciation was incorporated into the very Treaty of Peace, to make up of both of them but one body; though digested unto different Instr.ments as is expressly declared in the 33. Article of the Treaty of Peace, wherein speaking of the Contract of Marriage, to which they refer themselves, these words are added, which though it be separated hath the same force and vigour with the present Treaty of Peace, as being the principal part thereof, and the most precious pawn of its greater security and lasting.

But the *French Lawyers* preferring the little quirks of Law before publique faith; And pretending they might bring the Authority of solemn Treaties (which are the true and indeed the only Law between Sovereign Princes) under the Cavil of *Municipal Laws*, and Local Customs, endeavouring to persuade the World that their Master was not bound to stand to what he had so solemnly promised and confirmed by sacred Oaths: And the *French King* after the death of the late King of *Spain*, claimed (notwithstanding the said Renunciation)

ascension) a great part of the *Spanish Low-Countries*, as being devolved to him in right of his Wife, by the *Municipal Laws* of those Countries; And to back his unexpected Claim with more effectual means he invaded the Country with a powerful Army.

This Invasion, so contrary to his Engagements, & so destructive to the very essence of the *Pirenian Treaty* was attended with some circumstances no less surprising than the breach itself.

The one was what passed at *Paris* between the *French King* himself and the *Marquis De la Fuente* Extrordinary Ambassador from *Spain*, And the other, what the *French Ambassador* (the *Arch Bishop of Ambrun*) declared at *Madrid* in his Masters name.

As to the First, The said *Marquess De la Fuente* being upon his return into *Spain*, after the Death of the late King his Master, and being not without apprehension and jealousy, the great preparations, made in *France* were intended against the Queen his Mistress, and the King her Son, was very earnest with His Most Christian Majesty, to give some new and greater Assurances to the Queen of *Spain*, of the reality and sincerity of his intentions to quiet and settle her mind against all the contrary advices she received from all parts; whereupon the most Christian King did, with all possible Asseveration, engage his Faith & his Royal Word to the said Queen, that he would Religiously keep the Peace, & continue a faithful friendship both to her and to her Son.

And the *Arch Bishop of Ambrun*, after the *French Army* was already in the Field, and had possessed *Charleroy*, some four or five days before the News of it came to *Madrid*; did in *Verbo Sacerdotis*, and upon all that is most sacred amongst the *Roman Catholics*, protest and vow to the Queen, that his Master intended nothing less than what was reported of him: And would never break with the King of *Spain*, or invade his Dominions as long as he was under Age.

But the March of the *French Army*, and the Hostilities they committed, agreeing so little with their promises, & the same being complained of; They answered it was no Breach and that they only went to take possession of what belonged to them.

This War or as the *French* term it, this friendly possessing themselves of the *Spanish* Dominions ended by the Treaty of *Ambrun*. After which contrary to the Treaty it self, they first dismantled all the

the strong Places and Holds of the County of *Fargundy* carried away all the Inhabitants out of the Country, and would have destroyed the rich Salt Pits of that Province, had not the powerful interposition both of *England* and *Holland* prevented that spoil.

Notwithstanding the same Treaty of *Aix*, they exacted great Contributions from the Dutchies of *Lynbourg*, and *Luxembourg*: They lay a new claim to some Towns; as important as any of those that have been granted to them by the Peace: They have confiscated the Estates of the Subjects of the King of *Spain*, that would not forswear their Allegiance; and have not spared the very Royal House of *Mary Mont*: Nay, as if these infractions were not sufficient and still to encroach as far as they were able they forced their way with great quantities of Merchandise through the *Spanish* Territories without paying the Customs, and not long after endeavoured to surprize the Town of *Hannover*.

Thus they have dealt with *Spain* ever since the *Pyrenean Treaty*.

Let us see now how other Princes have fared with them; we'll begin with the Duke of *Lorraine*.

By the *Pyrenean Treaty*, the said Duke was to be restored to his Dutchy of *Lorraine*, with all the Places and Towns which he had possessed in the Bishopricks of *Mentz*, *Toul*, and *Verden*. But *France* in the Execution of the other Articles of the said Treaty, deferred as long as they could the performance of that part, which related to the Duke, and refused still to return him his Country; till they had brought him to make another Treaty with them whereby he was forced to part with several considerable places over and above what had been granted to them by the general Peace; Then after a year and an half of an uninterred possession during which under several unjust pretences new quarrels were picked every day: They forced him with a considerable Army, to give them his Town of *Metz*.

And not long after, they again compelled him to sign a new Treaty, more disadvantageous yet than the two former; since which he could, as little as before have a quiet enjoyment of that little they had left him. They every day encroached upon his Jurisdiction the Limits of his Territories, and his Sovereignty itself; They laid

enormious Taxes upon his Subjects: They caus'd him to disband his Forces, and to raise new men again as they thought fit they kept him from revenging his own quarrels, to take part in that of others, they let loose all his Enemies against him, & stopp'd the Progress of his Armies, as soon as he had the least advantage: And in few words he was all that while more a Vassal to France, than a Sovereign. But yet all this while would not satisfy the *French Court*: And taking it ill that his Obedience was not altogether so blind as they would have it, they order'd one of their Generals to seize his Person, and to bring him either dead or alive, as it was very near being effected. A new way of dealing with a Sovereign Prince, not known yet in the parts of the World, and which may give some hopes to Europe of seeing ere long the West Governed by *Bushaws* as well as the East.

The Kingdom of Poland comes next, which hath lain a bleeding ever since they have had a *French Queen*, & which is at this instant in an eminent danger of being conquer'd by the *Turks*, through the means of the *French Cabal*, who having call'd into the Kingdom the Enemy of the Christian name meerly because they could not have a King either of French blood, or of French interest.

The Duke of *Newberg* was not much better us'd, and whilst they caus'd him to ingage the greatest part of his Estate almost beyond redemption in hopes of the *English Crown*, which they had promis'd to raise him to by the help of a strong party they had made in that Kingdoms. They underhand both contrary to their Trearies (as well with the *Electors of Brandenburg* as with himself) & to their reiterated promises and vows both by word of mouth and in writing; did by their Creatures and Agents Oppose the said Dukes pretensions, and endeavour'd with all industry to have the Prince of *Conde* preferred before all his Competitors. A particular deduction whereof will (if ever published) without any other instance be a sufficient warning to all Princes, and give them a perfect Character of the *French Court*.

The *Emperour* hath as little reason to thank them, and at the very time the most *Christian King* sent him Forces to joyn with his Army against the *Turks*, they begun to settle a Correspondence with the *Count Serin*, *Franchipani*, *Nadasti*, and *Tottenback*; from whence the so well known Conspiracy hath since broken out, as hath appeared by the depositions and confessions of some of the Accomplices who had been instrumental in carrying both money and Letters, from the *French Minister at Vienna* to the said Conspirators.

Not

Not to speak now of what arts they used to hinder his Election at first, and since that to lessen his Authority and disturb all *Germany* by their Intrigues and private Treaties, with several Privacies contrary to the Treaty at *Munster*.

To which may be added, that one of the great motives of bringing the *Turks* into *Poland* was the marriage of the *Emperors* Sister with their King.

Yet it must be owned also that the *French* seem to have repented their pernicious intrigues and Caballing in that Kingdom for when they saw the *Emperor* preparing in earnest to assist the *Dutch* to disswade him from that design, and to engage him (if it had been possible) not to concern himself or take part in the Quarrel, they very fairly offered him to put into his hands and deliver him all the Original Letters they had from their Creatures and Friends in *Poland*. To the end both his *Imperial Majesty* and the *King of Poland*, his Brother might take what course they thought fit with those Rebels: A fair warning to all those that prefer *French* money before their Loyalty, and the true interest of their Country.

Nay I doubt the *Swedes*, their good Friends have not always been pleased with them: And they cannot to this day forget that some ten Years since, having made a Treaty with the *French* whereby they were to receive, by way of Gratuity or Pension, Sixteen hundred Thousand Crowns, the *French* (upon second thoughts) finding their Treaty with *Sweden* of little use to them refused to ratifie it and sent them *Monsieur de Trelon*, who without more words told them in short, that the King his Master declared it to be void. A fine Court style for one Prince to use to another! And a short Majestick way of Rescinding all Treaties.

It were both needless and tedious to examine now how well they have observed their Treaties with *Holland*, since they cannot so much as assign the least cause of the War they make now, and in their Declaration tell us only of a mauvaise satisfaction of their being ill pleased, which would tend to the Diminution of the glory of a most *Christian King*, unless to please himself better, he put *Europe* in a Flame, and endeavour to bring all under his subjection.

But it may be thought all other Princes and States have had much cause to complain of the *French* not to say worse his Majesty hath been hitherto either more fortunate or more beholding to their generosity and kindness. This must be now inquired into. I will not in-

sist much upon the expressions of their kindness to his Majesties Person, whilst he was a'road since they may pretext the interest of their Kingdom and palliate their dures and inhumane dealing, by a necessity of preserving themselves. But I hope no such necessity compelled them to oppose his Majesties happy Restoration with so much violence as they did, and to Cabal with his greatest Enemies to keep him out of his Kingdoms, which his Majesty was so sensible of, that upon his coming into *England* he commanded away the *French Ambassador Eordaux*, and would not suffer him to come into his presence.

Since that time they have often endeavoured to ingratiate themselves, & have made great protestations. But after several propositions of Leagues, and many Arts used to raise Jealousies between us and the *Hollanders* (Dreading nothing more then a durable & firm friendship between two Nations, who if united might easily set what bounds they pleased to their ambition) they at last sided with the *Dutch*, though with no other intention then to see us destroy each other, or at least so far weaken and exhaust our selves, that they might with less opposition invade their Neighbours, and increase their Naval strength, nay their policy went further, and in the very heat of the War they still kept Negotiations on foot, and made Overtures and Proposals of Peace by means of the late *Queen Alaber*, whom in the end they deceived so far as to assure her (and by her his Majesty) that the *Dutch* would set no Fleet out (that Summer, the Peace was concluded) whilst underhand they pressed the said *Dutch* with all the Vigour and Earnestness imaginable to fit out their Ships, with a promise of joyning theirs to them.

Upon this Paroll of the *French Court*, tis too well known we had no Fleet out as well as what followed upon it when the *Dutch* meeting with no opposition, entred into the River of *Charham*; so that though the *French* had no other hand in it, they had been still the true cause of that unhappy accident: But withal it is more then probable they were themselves the Authors of that Counsel, and most certain it is they knew of the design before the attempt was made: As might be proved by several instances if necessary:

After this, the peace being concluded at *Breda*; the *French* were by the Treaty, to return us *St. Christophers*, in the manner and form therein expressed. But instead of performing it according to the true meaning, (and the very Letter of the Article) they have still from time to time, upon several unjust and frivolous pretences, put off his Majesties

justies Commissioner. that went to receive it; till seeing a necessity of complying with us in so small a matter, whilst we were preparing to run so great a danger for their sake: they delivered it at last to Sir *Charles Winder*, somewhat above a year since. But before the delivery of it they destroyed all the Plantations, plundered and carried away all that was portable, laid the whole Country waste, and left it in a much worse condition than if it had never been planted. And as if the detaining of his Majesties Territories had not been sufficient they interrupted the Trade of his Subjects in those parts; and assuming to themselves the Sovereignty of those Seas; they would not suffer any Ships but their own, to sail by, or about their *Islands*. And in Truth upon no other Ground, have brought in as Prizes, and confiscated several Vessels. Not to speak now of the great discouragement our *French Trade* hath many years since lain under; through their unjust practices and manifold devices, which have been such, that we do not of late send into *France* the fourth or fifth part of what Goods and Commodities were formerly sent over.

This late carriage of theirs in *America* brings us to their present Alliance with his Majesty. And as the greatest care of those that have advised the King to this League, have been to keep from the view and from the knowledge of the World, what *Articles* are agreed upon; it is not to be expected we should instance in the particular Breaches of what we are all Strangers to. For example, we cannot tell whether it was agreed the *French Squadron* should fight, and so dare not assure they have broken their Treaty by not fighting. But I suppose there are very few, but have heard of the Wager laid by the *Spanish Ambassador* in the beginning of the War; and how far the *French Conduct* agreed with his Predictions. It would not neither impeach any man upon general Reports and Rumours, but however it is observable, that the greatest number of the *Dutch Commanders* are of Opinion, and have often publicly declared, that the *French Ships* were thus kindly used by theirs out of particular respect *De Witts Brother* had to them.

If from the Sea we come ashore, we'll find (as far at least as they came to our knowledge) most of their promises deceitful; all the Art imaginable used to ensnare his Majesty.

And lastly, a perfect and reiterated Breach of the essence of their Treaty, whatever the words may be; all those that have been never

As little convenient at Court may remember that one of the great Arguments used and suggested by the *French*, to make the conquest of *Holland* appear both safe and easie; was that his most *Christian Majesty* had assurances from all the great Princes in *Europe*, they would no ways concern themselves in the Quarrel. *Spain* would be glad to see their old Rebels chastised. The Emperour had his hands full, & durst not stir if he would for fear of the *Turks*. *Brandenburg* should demand his Towns, and the *Northern Crowns*, would either sit still or endeavour to have a share in the spoil. And then this was so readily embraced, that even after the Exchange of the Ratifications of the Treaty betwixt *Spain* and the *United Provinces*; they would not own there was so much as any agreement And for a good while we flattered our selves that the Leagues of the *Catholic King* and other Princes, were surmises of the *Dutch* to raise their Reputation, and quiet the minds of their People. But when this was past denying, they came off with blighting discourses of the Forces of the *Dutch Allies*; and *Monsieur de Turenne* would cut them all to pieces, if ever their Temerity did bring within his reach.

At the Rate the Alliance with *France* was discomfited of before the War broke out. standers by could not but think (and I believe if Truth were inquired into, it will be found his Majesty intended no more at first and was engaged no farther) the *French* should be the Principal in this War, and *England* joyn their Forces with them as *Auxiliaries*, to have in case of need, a safe and honourable Retreat in their Power. But as soon as the *French* thought his Majesty could not well go back nor take new Counsels; they openly declared it was none of their Quarrel, and that they onely engaged in it to assist his Majesty out of respect to his person. By which meant his Majesty was perswaded and induced to declare War first, and to expect afterwards the assistance of the *French*.

I suppose his Majesty will not thank them neither for piving out in all *Roman Catholic* Princes Courts, That this is a War of Religion undertaken meerly for the propagation of the *Catholic Faith* and as the *French* Minister at *Vienna*; expressed it in a solemn Speech to the Emperours Council, which hath been since Printed in *French* that the *Hollanders* being *Heretics*, who had forsaken their God; all good Christians are bound to joyn and unite to extirpate them and to implore Gods Blessing upon so good a work. Nay to confirm this the

the more they have lately declared and assured many Princes, that to let *Europe* see how far they are from any such design as has been laid to their Charge: and to satisfy all the World they entered into this VVar out of a Religious Zeal; and for the Glory of God. they are ready to part with all their Conquests, and return to the *Islands* all the Towns they have taken from them; if they will but re-establish the true VVorship they have banished from their Territories.

How far now this may be agreeable to his Majesties Interest, or to the *XXXIX Articles*, let any unprejudiced man judge.

But an undeniable proof of the uprightness of the *French Court*, is their carriage in the Negotiations of Peace with the *States*. In short, the matter of Fact is thus;

The passage of the *French Army* over that Branch of the *Rhyne*, called the *Wall*; having caused a general consternation all over the Country, and the confusion they were in being such, that they could hardly resolve whether to yield or defend themselves.

The *States* on the 11th. of *June*, named several *Deputies* to be sent, some to his Majesty, and the rest to the *French King*; to know of them both upon what terms they would be willing to agree and come to a Peace.

Those that came to his Majesty were met upon the way as far as *Graves-end*, to forbid them the Court and were conveyed to *Hamp-ton Court*; there to continue in an honourable confinement, till we could hear from the most *Christian King*, and know of him whether the said *Deputies* might be admitted; his Majesty being unwilling to give the least offence to the *French*, And not thinking it either lawful or convenient (without their participation) so much as to hear what the *Dutch Deputies* Errand was.

But the other *Deputies* came no sooner to the *French Court*, but two *Secretaries of State* were sent to them, and without further delay, desired to know first if they had full power to Treat; and in the next place, what the *States* could propose in order to a speedy Peace. The *Deputies* answered, they were only sent to know his most *Christian Majesties* Pleasure, and that their Masters had thought it a greater respect to him to receive his Proposals then to offer any Conditions themselves, with this answer; the *French Ministers* went to their masters and came back immediately to the *Deputies*, to let them know, it was expected the *States* should make the Proposals; and that the most

Christina

Christian King could not enter upon any Treaty unless they had full Power. Telling them with all (to quicken them and to hasten the conclusion of the work) that they were to consider, That whatever his mo^t *Christ an Majesty* had Conquered was already his own; and therefore he could no ways part with it unless they gave him an Equivalent, as well for what he might conquer farther, before the Conclusion of the Treaty, as for what he possessed at that time: Whereupon *Monsieur de Groot* (one of the *Députés*) being gone to the *Hague*, he was sent back with all speed and Authorized in a very ample manner together with his Colleagues to treat and conclude a Peace with the *French*.

Upon the return of the said *De Groot*, with the Powers after some conferences (part o them with *De Groot* alone) *Monsieur de Louvois*, (one of the *Secretaries of State*) gave the *Dutch Députés* a project of a Treaty, or rather the pretensions of the King his master: Upon the granting of which, he was both willing and ready to return to his former Amity with the *States* and conclude a firm Peace with them.

Whereupon two things are to be observed; The one that the Conditions were such, that (if granted) would have made the *French King* as perfectly Master of the Country, as if he had conquered all by the Sword: and the other, that in all the *Articles* (which are still in being, and may be produced if need be) there was not the least word relating to *England*; and no more notice taken of his Majesty, or greater care of his Interest, than if he had not been concerned in the War, or in no League with the *French*. So that if by a wonderful Providence of God, the said Treaty, had not been unexpectedly broken off, *Europe* had in one day lost it's Liberty; And all we could have expected afterwards, had been the favour *Polyphemus* shewed to his Guests.

And to demonstrate further, that the intention of the *French Court* was not his Majesty should be a gainer by the War, *Monsieur de Groot* (whose word if he be not very much wronged ought to go a great way when he speaks of the *French*) declared at his second coming to the *Hague*, with the before mentioned Articles that the *French Ministers* had answered him the *States* his Masters might deal as they pleased with *England* and come off as cheap as they would because (as they pretended) they were not bound or engaged by their Treaty to procure them

them any advantages. A happy thing in the mean while to be engaged in such a War, with so Generous an *Allie*,

While this negotiation wa, on foot, and before the Treaty could be Concluded the *Prince of Orange* was miraculously restored to the dignity & Authority of his Ancestors, which having altogether Eclipsed the party that was inclined to treat with *France* upon almost any Terms, & the rest of the Country being all under Water, the *French* lost at once both their hopes of carrying the whole matter by a Treaty, and the opportunity of making a further progress by their Arms,

At the same time my Lord Duke of *Buckingham* and my Lord *Arlington* went into *Holland*. And the *French* who knew already they could neither bring the *Dutch* to a compliance, nor Swim over to the remaining Towns. And with all being full of Apprehensions and fear that by the Authority of the *Prince of Orange*, and through the interest he was like to have in his Majesty (chiefly if their practices & honest dealings came to be discovered) a Separate peace might be made between *England* and the *United Provinces* they Acted their part so successfully with our Plenipotentiaries, that they perswaded them to enter (in his Majesties name) into a new Engagement not to treat or conclude with the *Dutch* any Peace or Truce without them. For as to their promising the like it was a perfect mockery on their part, since they had already done their utmost to treat without *England*, and that after they had miscarried in the attempt, nothing could secure them but his Majesties refusing to accept of what conditions the *Dutch* would be willing to grant Him.

After this new Contract made, our Plenipotentiaries together with the *French Ministers* sent their joynt demand, and proposals to the *Dutch*, to be granted in Ten days or else no peace to be made which was the next master-piece of the *French*, for it is to be observed, first that the *French* Demands were in substance the same as they had made at first in their negotiation with *Monsieur de Groot* And since they were so unjust, and so Enormous, that the best friends they had then amongst the *States* could hardly swallow them themselves (much less to bring the generality to give their consent) without some modification. It was not to be expected that the Government being since the late Change, much more averse to the *French* than before, the same proposals again, should be better entertained, which was rendered more improbable by the addition of the *English* demands,

Secondly

Secondly, The *French* by the excessive height of their demands; seem'd to have encouraged (if not perswaded by some more effectual means) the said Plenipotentiaries not to come much short of them, which was attended with Two Fatal consequences. the one, that the War was certainly, by it, entayled upon his Majesty; And the other that it was a means to alienate the minds and affections of the *Dutch*, who were then inclined to give those advantages to *England*, which cannot rationally be expected hereafter.

Thirdly, Though the respective claims of the Two Kings had been singly tolerable, yet the joyning of them together made it impossible for the *Dutch* to grant either. From whence the *French* (and very rationally) conceived hopes that the *Dutch* finding themselves over ballanced by the joyn't power of their Enemies and seeing no way to come out of so destructive a War, and to have peace (and not a firm nor a durable one neither) without dividing their Country into a hundred pieces, and cutting off all their Sinews, had rather cast themselves into the Arms of their Conqueror, and laying aside all thoughts of Sovereignty, live in an entire Body under the *French* Domination. At least it were some comfort, if the *French Court* had but kept to this last agreement, which in so many respects was advantageous to them. But that they have not done neither: And as soon as they saw most Princes in *Europe* begin to be in Earnest, and that great succours were preparing for the Assistance of the *Dutch*, besides what forces were already in the Field, They understand made new overtures of Peace, and have still to this day been sending private Messages to the *Dutch*, wherein they take no greater care of *England* than they had done at *Utrecht*. And if the *Dutch* had not persisted in their refusal to Treat without their Allies, the *French* had long since concluded without theirs, and that upon very moderate terms as to the *Dutch*.

I suppose this will seem very strange, and will hardly be credited, but since as long as I am under this disguise, I cannot justify it as well as otherwise I might do it. All I can say at present is, there are those in the Kingdom that know the truth of it as well as my self, & I hope the world will not be long without a full discovery of it. And thus I end the first part of this discourse which hath swelled unawares into a greater bulk than I intended at first, though the matter would bear a great deal more without being exhausted.

I I.

Let us now come to the *Second Head*, and examine what the issue of this War may prove, and what may rationally be expected it will come to.

Were it either possible in nature, or so much as to be imagined that *Holland* might be turned into a new Lake, their Towns burnt and depopulated, and their Inhabitants either destroyed or Transported into remote *Colonies*, or part of them brought into this Kingdom, to increase the Number of our People; I fear no Arguments drawn from either natural Justice or Christian Charity could be forceable enough to put a stop to such a design: And in the case it would be hard for the ingenious and worthy Author of the Interest of *England* stated (as unanswerable as his Arguments are) to persuade men either Biassed, or not very well acquainted with the state of Foreign Affairs, That it must be the chief Interest of *England* to support the present Government of *Holland*.

But such a destruction being not to be thought on or expected by any man that is in his Wits; and since the Situation of the Country, and its Commediouness for trading in many respects, together with the Natural and Laborious Industry of the Inhabitants, will still continue under any change; To satisfy our selves how far we may be gainers by this War, we must consider in order to the general events that may be looked upon as in any degree of possibility.

In order to that I conceive all men will grant one of these four things must be supposed.

First, The absolute conquest of the *United Provinces* by the French.

Or,

Secondly, Our Conquering of them.

Thirdly, A Division and Sharing of the Country between us and the French

Fourthly, and Lastly, The Dutch recovering their losses, and with the help of their Allies, their withstanding both *England* and *France*. Of each of them in Order.

The absolute Conquest of the *United Provinces* by the French, and their being brought under their subjection, is a thing of that dreadful consequence, that the very thoughts of it must needs raise the blood of al

true *English men* And there is hardly any remedy too violent for so desperate a cure or means that could be called unjust, if necessary to prevent so great an evil, And therefore instead of losing time to prove what is so manifest and so obvious to the meanest capacities, I only beg of all my dear Countrymen to lay the present state of things to heart, and humbly move both Houses to consider, whether we be not already too near that evil day, and how far it is consistent with that Interest, with which they are intrusted, to hasten it by unseasonable and pernicious compliance.

Secondly, As to our Mastering the *Low Countries*, it can be but one of these two ways.

First, Our subduing of them by a Landing; and withall, beating the *French* out of what they possess already: Or,

Secondly, Their voluntary yielding to us and submitting themselves to his Majesty.

The first can hardly be so much as supposed or imagined by any Rational Man; For 1. If in the midst of their late distractions and the unpeakable confusion, which was in every part of the Country, no opportunity of Landing could be found though often attempted: How can it be expected it should be practicable by the next Summer, now they are all united and strengthened by the assistance of their *Allies*. 2. How can it be thought possible to Land an Army considerable enough to take all their Towns, and conquer the whole Country; Nay, to conquer the Conquerors themselves, and beat the *French* out. 3. Granting that the approach of our Fleet, would occasion a great disorder and consternation in the Country; and that the *Dutch* should not prove able to oppose our Landing; and at the same time to keep the *French* out, and defend themselves to the Landwards, what would the consequence of this be, but only to enable the *French* to Master the whole Country, whilst the *Dutch* should divide and draw off their Forces to oppose us? It being much easier for the *French* who are already in the Country, to march with all their Forces to *Amsterdam*, and to the rest of their Towns, before we can Land; then for us to prevent them by our Landing. 4- Lastly, if the *French Ships* are to have a share in the Expedition, what Security have we, their men will promote our own ends, and not their Masters; and that they shall not rather turn tayl against us: if occasion be.

And

And as to the voluntary yielding of the *Dutch* and their giving themselves up to us ; I may say it is as irrational and as fond a conceit as the other : And which therefore doth hardly need being confuted. But because some of our great men, have (even in Print. made use of this as of an Argument , both to justify the War in point of prudence , and to perswade the Nation to joyn and concur with the *Cabal* in their dark Counsels : It will be necessary, and we owe that respect to their quality, as to lay the matter open and unfold it with a little more care.

Were the *United Provinces* still entire and untouched and they in an election to joyn with and submit themselves (upon terms) either to *France* or *England*, it would be no hard matter to demonstrate and make it to appear that the ballance of true policy and reason should weigh down by much on the *French* side. And that the best part of their Trade would soon, if incorporated with us run out of their Channels into ours ; which all understanding men amongst them are so sensible of, that in Case this were in agitation, the interest of Religion (which besides they could secure some other way) should hardly carry it against profit and self preservation. But not to multiply debates and granting now that in such a Case, the *Dutch* would prefer our Domination before that of the *French*. Let us not examine what might have been if our suppositions were true. But what is like to be *De facto*, and may rationally be expected in the Cause stands.

First it must be observed that though their *Maritime Provinces* be far the most considerable , and those which have made that Commonwealth so powerful and so famous all over the World, yet their *In-Land Provinces* are of no less importance to the preservation of the whole, and are the Bull-works, and Out-works of the other, without which the main body would be soon streightned and brought in a little time to the greatest extremities.

For this Reason the *Spaniards* never offered Peace to the *Dutch*, nor could they have accepted of it if offered , till being Masters of Seven *Provinces*, and having withall conquered several Towns in *Brabant* and *Flanders*, to be a fence to their out *Provinces*, their *Territories* proved of a Competent extent to Lodge and Maintain upon their *Frontiers* the greatest Armies. And by removing the Seat of the War from their trading *Provinces*, be so much the more able to continue it , rather with advantage to them, then with the least inconvenience or trouble.

2. The Second thing we must take notice of is, that the greatest advantage of the Situation of the *United Provinces* lyeth in that several of the greatest Rivers in *Europe* not only run through their Country, but discharge into the Ocean within their Precincts. This openeth them an easy and an advantageous Trade into most parts of *Germany*, the *Spanish Low Countries*, and some *Provinces of France*, and makes a Reciprocity of commerce, and as were an Ebb and Flow, between their Rivers and the Ocean, being enabled by the first to carry at a cheap rate to the furthest parts of the world what goods and commodities the above-mentioned Countries afford and to return them by means of the same, the Richest spoils of the East and West.

Their natural Advantages accruing to the Inhabitants of these respective *Provinces*, by their being all *United* under the same Government, do link and tie them so fast together, that nothing but an external and irresistible force can divide them & whoever comes to be Master of the Rivers, must needs in a short time either be beaten out of his Conquests or else bring all the Havens, and all the Inhabitants Bordering upon the Sea, under the same subjection? The Sea Ports without the Rivers and the Rivers without the Ports being altogether useless, and a Foundation for an Endless and Destructive War,

This being premised, the Conclusion will easily be drawn, and since the *French* do already possess half of their Country, and are Masters of their chief Rivers, if the *Dutch* come either to lose the Ambition of Ruling, and being a Sovereign State or else are brought to the necessity of choosing a Master: It is plain they'll rather submit themselves to the *French King*, who hath half conquered them already, and hath in his own hands that part of the Country without which they cannot subsist, than by giving up the remaining part to *England* to entail a war upon them, which besides their subjection to a Foreiner as well as if they were under the *French*, will exhaust what Treasury they may have left, and from a Flourishing Estate bring them to perfect Beggary.

To summe up all: It cannot be supposed the *Dutch* will ever chuse a Master, and submit themselves to the Government of a Foreign Prince, unless they are driven to it by an unavoidable necessity. This necessity cannot proceed but from the sense they may have of their own weakness, and of a desire to live in peace and free themselves of a war which is so destructive to them. Now if they do submit themselves

selves to *England*, in opposition to the *French*, the Peace they seek will be furdor off them then ever, & their remaining Country will be the fear of an endless war, whereas if they give themselves up to the *French*, they will be United again in an intire body, enjoy rest and Peace, and live under the Protection of a Prince, who of all Princes in *Europe* is best able to defend them against all their Enemies, and whose interest will be to give all possible encouragement to their Trade- and to make their Country the Nursery of his Seamen, and in all other respects, the supports of his Naval Strength. Nor to mention that if they must be still at first, they might rationally hope to have the satisfaction afterwards, of lending a helping hand to bring their Neighbours, and in truth all *Europe* into the same condition with them.

Thirdly, we come now to the dividing and sharing of the Country with the *French*, which by what hath already been said will appear either impracticable, or rather hurtful than advantageous, for this sharing must be either by a conquest on both sides, as the *Dutchies* of *Cleve* and *Juliers* were formerly, when *Prince Maurice* and the *Marquess of Spinola* entred at the same time into those countries with two great Armies & took each what they could, the one on the behalf of the *Elect* of *Brandenburg*, & the other of the *Duke of Neuburg*, or else that the *French* having conquered and possessed all, should give us part of their acquisition.

The first cannot be supposed as long as we have no Army in the Country. And in truth can bring none able to match that of the *French* and to conquer as fast as they, though they had not a foot of Ground in the *United Provinces*: But as the case doth now stand, it is plain, they would be Masters of all before our long Boats could come on Shore.

And as to their giving us a share, after an absolute conquest there are 3 things to be considered. 1. It is worth the inquiry, how far they are engaged by their Treaty, and what share we are to have: for all appearances, are very deceitful, if the *French* have promised to give any thing more then a fair leave to take what we can. 2. It is apparent by what hath bin said before, at what rate their promises and other such Engagements are to be valued. 3. The nature and constitution of the country being such that it cannot stand divided, without not only very great inconvenience to both parties, but the destruction of one of them.

The

The *French King*, whatever he had promised, cannot be willing to give us such a share as would bring his own under the *English* subjection, & if his Majesty should have but an inconsiderable part of the Conquest, he could neither reap any benefit by it nor protect it from the *French* power without exhausting both his Treasure and his Men. Nay, it may be said further, and all that know the Country will grant that unless *Amsterdam* with the *Zuyder* sea were split, & all the shipping dividing to have each one half of the whole, no true division can be made: And whose is Master of that Town will soon or late subdue all the rest.

It is true if we had some Sea Towns, and the *French* had nothing to do with the rest, it might be for a while a curb to *Holland* and procure some advantages in Trade. But if the *French* possess all the Country; what proportion can there be between the acquisition and ours? And after the accession of so great a power to their Empire, can any rational man imagine some few places they should give us, would be a balance to their Forces, or a secure Fence against their Ambitious and aspiring thoughts?

To clear this further, and to demonstrate how dangerous it is for *England* to destroy the balance of *Europe*, in hopes of having a share in the spoil, and of increasing our Dominions. It is to be considered that in the perusal of our *English* Histories we find all our Foreign Conquests either unfortunate in the end, or an unprofitable charge to the Kingdom; whilst to maintain them, the Seas must be perpetually crossed for supplying them with Men, Money, and Necessaries. Nay, after the Conquest of the best part of the Kingdom of *France* we could not defend it long against the remaining part, and even lost what belonged to his Majesties Royal Ancestors by right of Inheritance, after a quiet and uninterrupted possession for some hundreds of years. Since that time what new acquisitions hath been made, hath likewise been returned either for considerable Sums of Money, or upon some other considerations relating to the State of *Europe* in those days.

And last it might be objected. That those former Conquests were either less prudently undertaken, or harder to be kept than these we seen to go upon now: It is observable first that our Forefathers either undertook alone the said Conquests, or else if he joyn'd with any other Prince (as when they were assisted by the House of *Burgundy*) they still had kept to themselves the greatest and most considerable share. Secondly; That it was ever the interest of some of the Neigh-
bours

bouring Princes ; *England* should preserve some part (at least) of the said Acquisitions , and have still a footing on the main , for the Common safety and for the speedier and easier relief of our Allies. And yet though these two conditions met together, either the essential difficulty of the thing it self, or our natural unaptne's to preserve what we have once gotten , hath made all *European* Conquests unsuccessfull , and in truth prejudicial to us.

But the case being thus , what Judgement can we make , and what can we rationally expect or promise our selves of our intended joyn't conquest with the *French*, where those conditions before mentioned are altogether wanting ? And where first far from conquering our selves we only countenance and promote (y our strenghtning the *Dutch* y Sea) the invasion of a Country which even whilst it was nothing near so considerable as it is now all *Europe* hath looked upon, not only as a fair step but as the last part of the way to the Universal Monarchy : And which did on one occasion to give a confederacy against the house of *Austria* to wrest those Provinces out of their hands. 2. It is as plain, it is not the *French King's* Interest to give his Majesty a considerable part of the conquests : or to let us cry long what he might peradventure give us at first for some other ends of his own. And to secure this unknown share to us, I do not see we have now any *Talbots* or *Earls of Esford* at the head of our Victorious armies to set up his Majesties Standard in the conquered Towns, & leave *English* Garrisons in them. But instead of that whilst the *French* march on, and do enlarge their Empire we please our selves with calling the *French* Forces our Forces, & endeavour, if not to persuade our selves at least to persuade others, all this is done for the Honour and glory of the *English* Nation, for the advancement of Trade, for the safety of his Majesties Person, the support of his Royal Authority, and the happiness of his Kingdoms. It is true we do not well know as yet (what) we are to have but somewhat we'll have however (say our Great men.) And we will not believe the *French King* shall let us go without a reward, for the pains we take in raising him , as much as in us lyeth to the Throne of the universal Monarchy Nay, supposing the worst (saith a great and noble Champion for the *French* , in a Printed Letter to Sir *Thomas Osborn*) that we should be so ill advised, as to let the *French* take all and leave us nothing , yet even in that Case, tho *French King* would rather make their strength at Sea inconfi-

derable, by their being subject to him, than his own more formidable, by his being their Master.

I confess this is a new Demonstration in Politicks which few men would have dream'd of; and if that be all our safety, I hope no true *Englishman* will be swayed by the authority or quality of those who go about thus to argue the Kingdom out of its liberty, and turn *England* into a *French Province*.

10 rthly, The extream danger and fatal Consequences of some of the former suppositions, and the impracticableness of the other being thus (and I hope clearly) demonstrated; we need not lose much time to press that increase (which is the only possible event that remaineth) the *Dutch* shall recover their losses, and with the help of their Allies be able to deal both with *England* and *France*. It cannot be his Majesties interest to continue a War which will miserably impoverish his Kingdoms and by the continual Losses the *Merchants* do and are like to sustain, bring the Trade of the Nation into such a decaying condition, as will not be repaired in many years of Peace. Especially if *Spain* be further provoked to proceed to an open Breach with us, as it is more than probable, they will ere long be forced to do.

But because I see many are apt to look upon this War through a kind of Cloud and seem to be unwilling to have a distinct Notion of the ill consequences with which it is attended; but reflect only in General and confusedly upon a supposed destruction of the *Dutch*, & seem imaginary Advantages as tewing to us by it which yet they cannot instance in; much less demonstrate upon any Rational Grounds: I think it necessary to add what we have said already, some few Considerations relating both to *Spain* and the *Empire*.

As to *Spain*, it is first well known what that *Crown* is to expect from *France*, as soon as these may have any opportunity of destroying them. And I suppose no body doubts but that the *Spanish Court* will by all possible means oppose the Encrease and stop the Progress of the greatest and formidablest Enemies they have.

2. It is as plain, that in Case the *French* come to be Master, the *United Provinces*, the *Spanish Netherlands* will of Course and unavoidably fall into their hands, notwithstanding the famous Triple League which by the way will be Triple no longer, when the *Dutch Common-wealth* is gone.

3. Although the Crown of *Spain* had no Dominions in the *Low-Countries*,

Countries, It would be as much their interest to preserve the *United Provinces* entire. And in true policy, they ought to venture all their Kingdoms: and to the very last of their men to prevent if it be possible so formidable an accession of Naval Power to the *French*, after which no *Plate Fleet* or *Gallies* could ever come safe, nor consequently their Monarchy stand much Longer.

4. The *Emperor* being already engaged, and hostilities being between him and the *French*, *Spain* can no longer stand out, and they are bound to run the same fortune as well by late and private Treaties as by the Joynt-interest of their Family.

5. And lastly *Spain* having already by their Assistance given to the *Dutch*, whereby all the considerable Towns in *Brabant*, were preserved, and by the late Attempt upon *Cherbourg* so highly incited the *French* against them, they cannot venture nothing more by an open Treach it is much safer for them to declare whilst the hands of the *French* are full then to be exposed to their fury after their Conquest ended. From all this it plainly followeth, that a breach between *Spain* and *France* is not to be avoided. But the same Arguments prove likewise that in case we do persist in our Alliance with the *French*, they must break with us as well as with them: And since they are so far concerned in the preservation of the *Dutch*, they cannot think themselves safe if the others are destroyed.

It is their Interest by making this War as destructive to us as they can to perwade us more effectually than they could do hitherto into a friendship with their Allies, for to say they dare not proceed to a Treach they are afraid of us, and we know how to Order them in the *West Indies*: This were good if their *All* did not lye at stake, and if by their breach with us they could endanger more then the same *All*. Whereas to the contrary by venturing all they may, and will in all likelihood, save both themselves and all *Europe*.

This being Granted (as it must needs be if truth do in the least prevail with us;) I need not use many words to make all *England* sensible of the sad consequences of a *Spanish* NVar; I'll hint only those that are undeniable: As first, the seizure of all our *Merchants* Estates, amounting in the whole to a vast Sum, 2. The loss of our Trade with them, which of all other is the most beneficial to the Kingdom; And without which our *VVollen* goods must lie upon our Lands, and half of our *VVeavers*, *Spinners*, &c. go a begging.

3. The Interruption of our *Levant and Plantations Trade*, which cannot in case of Breach be secured by ordinary Convoys. And (not to mention the *Spanish* men of War which both as to number & strength are sufficient to cruize in the *Streights*) With what either encouragement or safety can our Traders venture abroad, if, besides the *Dutch Capers*, the Seas come to be infested with *Privateers, Buccaneers, Assassins*, and *Manroves*? Who are none of them inferiours to the *Flushingers*, and are as well Skilled as they are in the Art of Piracy; Nay, did not these very men without any help take above fifteen Hundred Ships from us, in the late *Spanish War*, when *Spain* was at the lowest; and fought alone against us and *France*. 4. By the loss or at least the interruption of our Trade, his Majesties Customs; which is the considerable Branch of his Revenue will come to little or nothing; so that to support the War new Taxes must be raised in lieu of it: And proportionably so much greater Subsidies granted to his Majesty.

If from *Spain* we come to the *Empire*; we find the Emperor himself and the Elector of *Brandenburg*, already engaged in the Quarrel, and many other Princes upon declaring, so that it is now high time both for the Parliament and all true *Englishmen*, to look farther then we have done yet and to examine with more care the consequence of this war. For the Fire, which both we and *France* have kindled, is like to consume all *Europe*, if we do not make hast to quench it and by a timely Retreat give way to safe Councils. And for a close to this second Part of our Discourse, I desire the following Considerations may be seriously Debated and weighed.

First, What horrid spilling of Christian blood we'll be the occasion of, if by our wilfull promoting of the Ambitious designs of the *French* (even so palpable against our Interest) we force all the rest of *Europe* to take up Arms in their own defence, and to unite all for their Common safety and for the preservation of that Liberty which (as though we were led by Witchcraft) we merrily go about to destroy.

2. How prejudicial this War will be to us, in case the confederate Princes do over-balance the Power of *France*; And by raising the Reputation and the Credit of the *Dutch* (which last is the only thing they want) enable them not only to pay their *Land Armies*, but likewise to set out as great and considerable Fleets as ever. And I do not see that either of them ought to be looked upon as very improbable; since

since first it is very certain, and all those that knew the country will grant, That if the *Hollanders* had but some prosperous success either by their own Armies Or by the help of their Allies, they were able to take up without trouble, and in a very short time, as much money as they may have occasion for. And in the second place it seems pretty rational to judge that the house of *Austria* with the conjunction of many Potent Princes, will struggle a while for their lives, and may be hard enough for the *French*.

3 But how much greater will the danger be if neither *Germany* nor *Spain* are able to stop the Progress of the *French*? And in case they must all yield, and submit themselves to the Victorious Arms of the most Christian King, what will become of Poor *England*? must I's Majesty, (I speak it with due respect to his Royal and Sacred Person) be Tenant at will? or else Do we presume so far on our own strength as to imagine we may do what the rest of *Europe* cannot? And that though the *French* had conquered all, we should not fear them the more? and could still defend our selves against them? Let those that have advised his Majesty to this war speak, they must now pull their Vizard off, if they must appear in their true shape, & tell us plainly whether they are paid for making the *French King* the Universal Monarchy, and whether to bring down new Golden Showers into their Laps, *England* must at Least be made Tributary to the *French*, some few Hackney writers will not serve the Turn now, And twenty silly stories against *Holland* cannot make it advisable for us to joyn with the *French King* against the Greatest part of *Europe*. When this War was entered upon, no Enemies were thought on, at least spoken of, besides the *Dutch*. This was the only game we followed at first, And we expected no other prey to divide between us and the *French*. But now, supposing that we had taken never so much care for an equal sharing of the *United Provinces*, concerning which we refer our selves to what hath been said before, will our great men assure us further, That the *Lines* are also fallen to us in the pleasant places of *Europe*? And that his Majesty is to share the Universal Empire with the most Christian King? I grant the *Dutch* have offended us, And that our war against them is not unjust. But is it Just therefore to destroy so many Princes who cannot Subsist without them, & who for their own preservation are forced to Venture all to preserve the *United Provinces*? In few words; the Scene is altered: And though our infinite charity leads us, not to suspect the sincerity

cerity of the *French* or fear the increase of their power most Princes of *Europe* are of another mind; And whatever comes of it; they are resolved to stand by and protect the *Dutch*, as long as they are able to protect themselves; so that to conquer *Holland* All their Allies must be destroyed first: And the *French King* must needs be Master of the best part of *Europe* before we can have to our share either the *Eriel* or *Fulshing*.

I might Add several other considerations (And perhaps of no less weight then the former) to evidence the fatal consequences of this War. But by reason they do relate to the safety and preservation of our Laws (as well Ecclesiastical as Civil) I forbear, least it should be thought I go about (or intend in the least) to raise a Jealousie between his Majesty and his people: leaving it wholly to the care and wisdom of the both Houses to provide against it, by those means, and ways as to them shall seem meet and necessary, and as the Importance of the thing it self requirerh.

III.

So far I hope we have made good what we have said in the beginning of this Discourse; That this was an age of wonders, and that of those wonders the greatest was the present Alliance with *France*. And our prosecuting the war in so dangerous an Association. But since there are no effects so rare or so wonderful, as well in the Civil Government as in the Course of Nature, but have proper Agents to produce them, it is very fit to inquire into the causes of our Mysterious Councils, the better to judge of their true Nature.

In order to that, it will not be amiss, to look a little abroad and consider whether the Policy of some other Princes, who are engaged in the same Alliance with the *French* may not be a Leading case for us, and help our discovery at home.

Those Princes are the *Bishop of Munster* and the *Electors of Cullen*, And as to the first, All the world knows and we have had a sufficient experience our selves how far Money will go with him. Nay he is so far honest in this, that he doth think it no shame to own and profess it openly. He is but a Tenant for life, And whatever fills his Coffers, that he takes to be his true interest. The Universal Monarchy doth not intrench upon the Sovereignty of either, his Brothers or Nephews, And a considera-

derable and rich Legacy is the only Principality he can leave them; VVhile his present Subjects are destroyed, he hoards up Treasuries for his Family, and let the worst come. Some rich Abbeyes in *France* will bring him more Revenues than his *Bishoprick* as lately a Northern King did for the like, exchange his Crown, so that the case is clear with him. Add if the *States* would out bid the *French*, his Highness would soon forget his old Quarrels; and prove the best of their friends.

The next is the *Electo*r of *Cullen*, who (to do him right) is a Religious and a worthy Prince, And one who in his own nature, is a great lover of peace: But how could he be perswaded then to make his Country the Seat of War? To give his strong holds to a Forreigner? And to expose his Subjects to all the Calamities; which the inquartering of an Insolent Army doth bring along with it, To this the answer is plain, The Softness of his nature, and the easiness of his disposition hath made him devolve upon his Chief Ministers the whole Government of his Dominions, and the absolute direction of his Councils. His great favorite (another *Bishop*) is of the same Religion and Principles which that of *Munster* and the *Debonary* of the Master, is no less against the corruption of a Servant. *Quid vultis mihi dāne & tradam eum vobis?* Nay if the *Bishop* of *Strasbourg* (the said Favorite) doth stick at any hard thing, and is at any time somewhat troubled in his mind; for the undoing of so many thousands of Families, and for betraying his Trust so shamefully, he hath his Brother at his Elbow the late *Bishop* of *Mentz* a sworn Champion for the *French*, and of whom they used to say jeast (that he was a dear friend to them) ready to comfort them upon all occasions, and to spur him on with more fury. Thus if you ask, where the Interest of the *Arch-Bishop* of *Colenlyer* in this Alliance with *France*. And how comes it he will suffer his country to be laid as waste, as if the *Turks* had over run it? Let it not be wondered at, The *French* Pensioners will have it so, And the two Brothers *Fursberg* and *gs* are paid for it.

The case being thus abroad, I wish our Island might boast of the same happiness as to corrupt counsellors, Which *Ireland* enjoyeth in their being free from all Venimous creatures, And that no politic Vipers might be able to breath in our *English* Ay without soon breathing out their lives, But alas! our chronicles do furnish us with too many Instances of the contrary, and without looking any further back for Presidents

dents his Majesty himself, and this Very Parliament have (not many years since) sufficiently expressed how far they are of opinion, that Great Ministers may betray their trust.

On the other side, because some have been guilty, they must not be all indifferently condemned, and we ought to have a great care not to pass a rash Verdict upon Persons whom his Majesty hath irradiated with so many illustrious beams of his Princely favour. The safest way then not to wrong neither the cavel nor the Truth, is to take a short survey of the Carriage of the chief promoters of this War, Leaving the Judgement of either their Innocency or their Guilt to the unprejudiced Reader.

1. I will not insist much upon some whispers (come too loud talking of late) of the wonderful effects the French Kings Liberality had (almost four years since) in converting the strongest opposers of his Interest and though there be many odd passages in it which are come to the Knowledge of several considerable members of both Houses yet being not able myself to lay the whole matter open, and having it only at the second hand I leave the full discovery of it to the party Concerned, who (I am informed upon the least encouragement, and provided he may do it with safety to his Person) will at any time be ready to trace out (in the view and to the satisfaction of the whole world, the first steps towards our undoing, and to shew plainly when the foundation of this Mystery & conspiracy was laid.

2. But how ever whether all that is reported of this be true or not, I suppose it is not usual to see so great a familiarity (as hath been observed long since between Forreign Embassadors and First Ministers of State, Continual Treatings and frequent goings to Country Houses, there to stay several days and weeks, is a new thing in the World And an Embassadors using so Noble a house with so much freedom, gave a just cause to all observing men to conclude he had paid dear for it. I am sure his Majesty himself was not very well pleas'd with it at first, though they have proved pretty successful, in the Art they have used since to reconcile him to their intrigues.

3. We have seen in the first part of this discourse, how far, not only his Majesty, but his Great men likewise thought it necessary to keep a true ballance between the respective Princes and States of Europe, and to stop the progress of the French. What Steps were first made in order to it, and how the Dutch were courted into an Alliance with

with us; joyntly to allay the storms the disturber of mankind had raised, and quench the devouring flames. Nay, we made it appear the Tripple League was not entered into, out of a personal kindness to the *Spaniards*, but only for self preservation, and to prevent the over-running of Christendom. Whereupon tis worth the while to inquire of the same parties and desire them to inform both Houses, and the rest of the Nation, which way the ballance of *Europe* came to be so much altered; And what hath made the *French* since the Treaty of *Aix* more formidable than before? hath the House of *Austria* had a y new accession of Power? or did the Invasion of *Lorain* weaken the most Christian King? Could we value our selves for or five years since by raising some few Banks against some few *French* Waves, and now be as proud again of letting in their whole Ocean? The Jeopardy *Europe* was supposed to be in was (most certainly) infinitely increased And the same *Hanibal* is now much nearer our Gates than ever he was, & yet we never thought our selves so secure; and whilst the Ship of *Europe* is near sinking, the *Caballe* (which is the measure of their faith) do not apprehend the least danger. Happy men who can so suddenly be transformed into new Creatures! Who would not wish to have a share in your enlightning Graces?

But to the matter of fact, by the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle* all Princes in Christendom were invited into the garenty for the greater security & strengthening of the Agreement then made between Spain and France. Pursuant to this (as we have said before) his Majesty sent a minister to the Protestant Princes in Germany to invite them into the Garenty of the said Treaty of *Aix*, or in other words, into the Tripple-League. And not long after, upon the same grounds proposals were made to several other Princes, to draw them into the same League; To which, the Duke of *Lorraine* (vvith some other that had promised to come in) being very much inclined, and the thing being brought very near a conclusion, the most christian King (vvho by that time vvas most manfully vvorking under ground to destroy the Tripple League, & vvho dreaded nothing more then a faster tying of that Gordian-knot) to prevent the association, did very fairly invade *Lorraine*, and vvas near taking the Duke himself Prisoner.

In this Invasion, there are three or four things that are observable. d. Besides the scandal of such an unjust oppression, and the indignation it ought to have raised in all Princes, to see a soveraign Prince thus hunt-

ed out of his own Dominion; nothing could ever give a greater insight into the ambitious Designs of *France* nor discover more fully their Intentions; none but an Universal Monarch, can pretend to a right of displacing Princes, and disposing both of their Lives and of their Territories, and therefore nothing could deserve a higher Resentment, nor a more vigorous opposition from those that appeared so lately the Assertors of the liberty of *Europe*. 2. This Violence was an open Breach of the *Pyrenian Treaty*, and consequently of the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, which was a renewing and a further confirming of the other. And so far the Triple League was concerned in it. 3. It was destructive to the very end and scope of the said Treaty of *Aix*, which was to put a stop to the progress of the *French*, and to the increase of their Power the Addition of that fair Dukedom, being as considerable, if not more than their Conquest in the *Spanish Netherlands*, and with all part of the *Spanish Dominions* either blocked up and Besieged by it (as *Luxemburg*) or cut off from the rest: and all communication taken from them, as the County of *Burgandy*. 4. The great Zeal which the Duke of *Lorrain* had expressed to joyn with the other Princes engaged in the Triple League was the true cause why he was thus persecuted: though some other unjust and frivolous pretences were used.

Upon all these grounds the Duke of *Lorrain* was in good hopes the Triple League would protect his innocency, and not forsake *Europe* by forsaking him. And to quicken them he sent some of his Servants to the respective Courts of the Parties Engaged. Whereupon our great Men advised his Majesty not to concern himself in the Quarrel, though his own inclinations and love to Justice, led him not to refuse his Assistance to a Prince who had laid upon him many great and high Obligations, and especially in an occasion wherein the Liberty as well as the Honour of *Christendom* was so far concerned. But the Ministers it seemeth, carried it against their Master, and the Duke of *Lorrains* Envoy was sent back with a Complement and many expressions of Kindness but told withal the *French Invasion* was a Torrent not to be stopped at that time! And what was then the use of the Triple League? what will become of all the fine Speeches made in its Commendation? and was it harder to oblige the *French King* to return *Lorrain*, than to force him to restore the *French Courts*, as he was by the

the Treaty of Aix; in case we had been still true to our Interest, and had been swayed by no other consideration? *Idem manens idem, semper facit idem.*

About the same time, whereas we had sent to several Princes to invite them into the *Tripple League*, the Emperour who might as justly have expected the same Complement, did by a Letter to his Majesty invite himself, and in conformity to one of the Articles of the Treaty of Aix desired to be admitted into the Garanty.

Upon the receiving of the Letter (his Majesty upon whose goodness some of our great Men had not had time to work yet) assured the Spanish Ambassador (who had delivered the Letter) he was glad his Imperial Majesty was so ready to come into the League, and told him he would cause an Instrument to be prepared in order to the said Admission. But when the resolution was taken, and Orders given for preparing the said Instrument; It was first moved that Mr. Secretary Trevor (who was not initiated in their holy Mi teries) might not have the dra wing of it though it was his proper Province, And then having made themselves the sole masters of the thing, a tollerable and reasonable honest draught was first brought in but before it was perfected, they acted their part so ingeniously (with the help of Monsieur Colbert) that in the end they possessed his Majesty with the opinion, that the admitting of the Emperour would be attended with very dangerous consequences, and that in case he came into the League, his Majesty would be engaged in all his Quarrels, and bound to make his Forces March (as the before mentioned Author of the Letter to Sir Thomas Osborn expresses himself) into the farthest part of Germany, as often as it should happen to be Invaded by the Great Turk. The late Secretary Trevor, opposed this as much as he was able, and endeavoured to satisfy his Majesty, that the Garanty of the Tripple League, as well as of the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle, related only to the Aggression and other Hostilities from either France or Spain; *Propteris* (saith the Treaty) by reason of the said Alliance. But the wary cautious men (as well as of the greater number) carried it, And the Emperours proffer was rejected.

Nay, as soon as some of our Semi-Gods, had cut the fatal Tripple Knot, with the Diamond Sword of their Alexander, the poor now, but formerly vaunted Tripple League, was trampled under foot, turned into Ridicule and less vallued than a Ballade: His Majesty and

they themselves, since the Treaty of Aix, had thought it very rational and very necessary withal, to invite other Princes into the said League, or in other words into the *Garanty* of the Treaty of Aix: persuaded to the VII. Article of the said Treaty, whereby all *Kings, States, and Princes* are invited into it. But as if they remembered neither his Majesties sending of *Envoyes* to the Princes of *Germany*, nor the words of the Treaty it self: They tell us now (in the same Printed Letter) *That the necessity of inviting all Princes into the Tripple League, is a maxime much in vogue with some who looking very grave, do therefore take it very ill if for that reason, you will not allow them to be infallible: And afterwards because the Tripple League is often mentioned, without mentioning the Garanty of Aix, (which is in truth the thing meant by it) to say (saith the Authour) we should invite them into the Tripple League-- That, if you mark, is such a kind of Figure in discourse as commonly is called a Bull. Fidem vestram, Dij immortales.*

4. We have gone yet farther then all this, And the civil applications of the *French*, and their kind entreaties did so prevail with us, that loathing the very thoughts of the *Tripple League*, and quating almost any thing that related unto it; we suffered an *Agent* of ours, one *Marsilly*, whom we had sent to the *Switzers* to invite them into the *Garanty* of Aix (and who was intercepted and taken Prisoner by the *French*, whilst he was very busie in the execution of what commands he had received not many Months before from our Great-men) to be broken upon the *Wheel* at *Paris*, although one single word from us would have saved his life. Neither did we take it ill (such is our good nature) that upon the very *Scaffold*, twenty Questions were put to him relating to his majesties Person. And (in that publick and infamous Place) a strict enquiry made into the particulars of what had passed between him and the King of *England*, for thus was his Majesty often mentioned and named.

5. But to take off somewhat of the wonder and strangeness of our neglecting, and forsaking our *Leagued* Friends for the most *Christiah Kings* sake, we soon shewed as much self-denial in our own concerns & grew civilized to admiration by our inward converse with the *monseurs* whereof we'll give only three instances.

The first is that whilst we stormed against the *Dutch*, for not promoting as far as they were bound, the coming away of some Families that

that would have put out *Savannah* we found no fault with the *French*; their keeping us above four years out of *St. Christopher's*. No more than with their destroying in the mean while, that part of the Island which belonged to his *Majesties* Subjects. And we would have thought it a rudeness if we pressed too hard on his most *Christian* Majesty for a speedy performance of his *Articles*. Nay if the *French* Colonies whose parts are to be believed, there was a very good understanding in relation to the said Island, between some of our *Grandees* and the *French* Court, as doth appear by the Narrative my Lord *Willoughby* delivered to the Council of *Plantations*, and which is entered in their Books,

The next is, That by any Ordinance of the *French* Privy Counsel, (which is now the Statute Law of that Kingdom) all their Sea & Land Officers, and Commanders in the Islands of *America* being strictly enjoined and required to secure their Master the Sovereignty of those Seas; the said Ordinances having been brought in by a person of Quality to the Cabinet Council, it was at first to be declaimed against but soon buried in oblivion, and put up amongst the useless Papers, though the *French* Pursuant to it, hath since much interrupted our Trade, and have proved infinitely vexatious in so much (as I am credibly informed) that the present Governour of *Jamaica* hath sent word since his being there) that notwithstanding their old Quarrel with the *Spaniards* it would be much easier to keep a good Correspondence with them than with the *French* our dear Allies.

And for a last Instance of our more than ordinary civility to the *French* several Traders in *London* have prepared a *Petition* to his Majesty in Council, to complain of the oppression their Factors and Agents lay under in *France*, with a true state of their Case, & a short account of their grievances, this came to the knowledge of some of our Great Ministers, and they having had the perusal of them before the delivery of it, stopt by their Authority all further prosecution of the matter, and put off the said Merchants with a promise they would acquaint the *French* Ambassador with their complaints, and see it should be redressed through his means. How far they have been encouraged in their Trade since that promise, they are best able to judge, but however it was not fit the Nakedness of our dear Friends should be thus exposed to the whole view of the Council-Board,

And the foregoing particulars are more than sufficient to satiate any

any impartial and understanding Reader, how far the French have influenced our *Councils*, and withal they give us a great light, and help us much to discern, whether in truth we have broken the *Tripple League* (or at least let it fall and dissolve of it self) for the reason, but because we are constrained to fall out with the Dutch, to defend our selves against their oppression, as the *Author* would perswade us, or else if it may not be said (upon much better grounds) that because it was not the French Interest that the *Tripple League* should subsist, we have therefore resolved to break with the Dutch, Thus to be subservient to the ends of his most *Christian Majesty*.

But by reason this might seem somewhat harsh at first, and be looked upon as too severe a construction of our Great mens intentions, it is necessary to evidence further how industrious the *Caballs* have been in their endeavours to make this War just (or to be thought so at least) after they had once resolved to make War.

Thus they first made a great noise of infamous *Libells*, horrid *Petitions*, *Pillars* set up and *Medals* coyned; to the infinite dishonour of his *Majesties* Person, and of his *Royal Dignity*, whereas to this day, none of those *Libels* or *Pictures* could be produced, And the *Pillars* had never any being but in the imagination of those who made it their work to raise a Jealousie between the *Two Nations*, and set *Europe* in a *Flame*. It is true there was a *Medal* Coyned which might have been spared; but as soon as it was known in *Holland* some exceptions were taken at it, the *Stamp* was broken in peices, and withal, all impartial men that have seen it could not discern any thing in it which could give so much offence, or that looked like an affront intended to his *Majesty*.


Besides this, thinking it very material to have in this, as well as in the late War, if not the clamour, at least the concurrence of the *Traders*; they sent for several of them, and endeavoured to draw from them some complaints against the Dutch for the strengthening of the *Good Cause*. Wherein it is very observable, that the *Committee* of the *East India Company*, being (amongst others) desired to bring in their *Grievances*, they answered and gave it under their hands, they knew of no wrong done to them by the Dutch since the *Treaty at Brada*, (or words to that effect) But it seemeth the Compiler of his *Majesties Declaration* was better informed, and knew more of the *Companies* concerns than their *Committee*.


But all this not serving the turn, the difficulties which did arise in the performance of the *Conditions* of the Surrender of *Suraam*, must be improved to the height, And even after *Secretary Trevor* had adjusted the matter with the *States*, and had received from them the *Orders* which were agreed upon *Bansters* going was retarded, and *Sir John Trevors* agreements (as if he had not faithfully discharged his trust in it) submitted to the censure of the Counsel of *Plantations*, where at last the said *Banster* pleaded so well his own and *Secretary Trevors* cause, that with much ado the one was cleared, and the other dispatched a way, though with many devices and tricks (too tedious to be inserted here) which (if not prevented) might have made his Voyage altogether unsuccessful: But we must not forget, that the very men who found so much fault with what *Mr. Secretary Trevor* had done, were themselves satisfied with much less, before they had harkened to new Counsels: And were not a little Angry with *Colonel Banster* for desiring more than the *States* were willing to grant. What (was it said at that time) do you think we must make War for you: Or that We are bound to procure you whatsoever may be advantageous, to your self, and to your fellow Planters? *Quantum mutatis ab illis.*

Their next work and (in truth) *Great Master Pille*, was the sending the *Yacht*, with *Orders* to Say! through the *Dutch Fleet*, and require striking to his *Majesties Flag*. And I am so far from justifying or excusing in the least the refusal which the *Dutch Admiral* made to pay what respective was due to the *English Colours*, that the *States* themselves do not own it, and are ready to enter into any new Engagement for preventing the like for the future. But there are several circumstances in it which are worthy of *Observation*: as That the *Dutch Fleet* was then at Anchor not far from their own Coast, and in a Station which by many *Geographers* is accounted no part of the *British Seas*.

2. That the *Dutch* were out at that time in pursuance of the *Tripple League*, and to be ready upon occasion to relieve the *Spanish Netherlands* which were threatened by the *French*, who were then in march with a considerable *Army* and came as far as *Dunkirk*, yvhich one vvould think vv as a very unfit time to send out on purpose to pick a Quarrel vvith them: And the rather because vve had promised the *Dutch* to set out a *Fleet* as vvell as they to joyn vvith theirs, for the common

common safety. 3. That the *Pensionaire De Witt* who Governed *Holland* at that time with a more than *Ministerial* Authority, took a pride in standing in punctilios in all things relating to *England*, which thinketh the *Common Wealth* it self to be less guilty of any disrespect shewed either to his Majesty, or to the Nation, through the haughtiness and private animosity of their *Minister*. And truly I trust needs say, that of all the things that are laid to the said *De Witts* charge there is hardly any which would make me apt to believe there was a *Private* understanding between the *French* and *Him*, than his carriage in this business, and his demurring so long upon the satisfaction which the greatest part of the *States* were willing to give to *England* whilst he knew full well, that it was a Quarrel sought by our *Ministers*, who wanted some popular pretence to make *War*; and keep their word to the *French King*. 4. That we stayed several months before we demanded satisfaction, least if we had demanded it too early, it had been granted us too soon. 5. That when *Sir George Downing* was sent over, he was bound by his Instructions not to accept of any satisfaction from the *Dutch* after a certain number of days which were prescribed to him, which is a very irregular and unusual of proceeding in *Embassies*, and much less practicable in *Holland* than any where else, It being impossible to have the resolutions of their *Towns*, and afterwards of their *Provinces* without a considerable time. 6. That this was made so much the more difficult by our demanding not only the usual striking, which (though ever practiced and due to *England*) was first *Nationally* agreed upon in 1654, and confirmed by the two Treaties with his Majesty in 1662. and 1667. But also a new kind of acknowledgement of the *Sovereignty* of the *Seas*, which is not mentioned in the said *Treaties*. So that by joyning them both in a *Memorial*, if the *Dutch* did demur upon the second & so delayed the Granting of the first, it was a ready way for us to clamour & possess the whole *Nation*, the *Dutch* had broken their *Treaty* and refused to strike to the *English Flag*. 7. That after the *Dutch* had given their answer to the said *Sir George Downings* *Memorials*, he refused to receive it, and came away without it, against a second Order he had received under his Majesties own hand, for which also he was committed to the *Tower*. But not to wrong the Gentleman, we must also own, that though he had a positive and latter command from his master, which did so far rescind his Instructions, yet his Friends have





have whispered in his behalf for his Justification, that he had received at the same time Letters from some of our Great *Ministers*, who conjured him as he tendred his own good to follow his *Instru-
ctions* and keep close to them. 8. Lastly, it is very observable that the *Dutch* having sent an *Express*, the *Answer*, Sir *George Downing* would not receive, we first replied it was dark, obscure, and insufficient. Upon which they sent an *Extraordinary Ambassador* who joyntly with the *Leiger Ambassador* told our *Ministers*, that his Masters intentions and desire to give his Majesty all possible satisfaction in the business of the *Flagg*. they both *Ordered* and *Impowred* him, to clear what might be obscure or dark in their *Answer*, and supply what was insufficient, and therefore desired them to instance in what they did not approve of, or did think amiss, or else that they would be pleased to draw up themselves after their own *Method and way*, what *Article* they thought necessary for the preventing of the like inconvenience. They *Answered*, the *States* with their *Ministers* knew best how to Frame and Word their own *Answers*, neither could it be expected they should draw up Papers for them. Whereupon the *Dutch Ambassadors* brought them a *Project* of an *Article* to be agreed upon concerning the *Flagg*, and asked them whether it was Worded to their mind, and if that would satisfy them. To which they gravely answered, that when they had signed and delivered it they would tell them their mind concerning it. And the *Ambassadors* refusing still to design it, unless they knew befor-hand it was *Satisfactory*, their conference was broke off; yet upon second thoughts, the *Ambassadors* having resolved to sign the said Paper, and to deliver it at a venture, they demanded a *New Conference*, which was promised them, and Seven of the Clock at night appointed, on the *Sunday* after the Engagement with the *Smirna Fleet*. But on the very same day least the *Dutch* might comply further with us then we desired, our *Grandees* did prevail with his Majesty to call extraordinarily a *Counsel*, and to have without further delay the Declaration of War, read and approved. So that when the *Ambassadors* came at their appointed time, with their Paper ready signed, they were told in short they came too late.

7. I might Add as many and as considerable Instances of what Art and Policy our great Men have used to deceive his Majesty; And to bring him by degrees into a likeing of their War. But this

matter being so ticklish and nice, that I fear I should not be able to go through with it (although I took never so much care) without exposing my self to the censure of the World, and having either my intention or some of my expressions misconstrued. I think it much safer and more prudent to draw a *Curian* over that part of the Ministry of the *Cabal*, and leave their *Reputation* so far untouched, since they have had the Skill to wave it (as it were) in more then one place into that of their *Master*.

8. For a farther clearing of this, and to satisfy our selves, as far as we are able, whether the Constitution we do seem to make of the *Carrage* and *Designs* of the *Cabal*, be not too partial. It will not be amiss if we endeavour to discover what their own Opinion was of it at first, and how far they were persuaded themselves, their New *Council* were agreeable to the true *Interest* of *England*, which will best appear by the two following particulars.

The first is, Their great care of not trusting with their *Mysterious Intigues*, Persons, whose either Quality, natural Courage, Honesty, or Experience, made them suspect they would be either too inquisitive, before they would joyn and concur with them, or else too resty and froward, if they chanced to be of another mind. And upon these fair and honest Grounds, they reformed their *Cabinet Council*; and turned at once out of the *Committee for Foreign Affairs*, *Prince Rupert*, the Duke of *Ormond* the *Lord Keeper*, and the late *Secretary Treasurer*: This being the first Secretary of *State* that was ever kept out of a Commission of that *Importance*. Not to mention several other eminent and considerable Privy Counsellors, who till then had been Commissioners in all Negotiations and Treaties with *France*.

Now in case the *Cabal* had not *Design* but what were for the Honour and the Safety of the *Nation*, why they should so industriously to conceal it from Persons that have deserved so well both from his Majesty and from the whole *Kingdom*, is what passeth my poor understanding: And whoever is able to uniddle this, *Erasmus magister Atoke*

But if this be no convincing *Argument*, the next, I hope, will be somewhat plainer; and both Houses are best able to judge, whether their sitting was so dangerous: or how faithful those *Conciliators* must be who could advise his Majesty to *Provoke* so often upon the *French Kings* desire; a *Parliament* whose *Loyalty* and *Zeal* for their *Sovereign*.

raign, is not to be matched in no former Age. We do not hear that either the *Oscils* or *Walsingham* ever advised the *Queen* their *Mistress* not to call her great Counsel, or suffer them to meet, when she was preparing to assist the *Protestants* in *France*, or to protect the *United Provinces* against *Philip* the Second, King *James* had no reason to fear his *Parliament*, who if they came together, would not oppose the assistance of the *Palgrave*. And his *Majesty* now Reigning, hath in the former *War* against the very same *Enemies*, had a sufficient experience of the readiness of both *Houses*, to promote as far as they are able, any design which they conceived may tend to the honour and safety of his *Government*, and the prosperity of the *Kingdom*. VVhy then should our *Great Men* obstruct the cheerful Compliance of his *Majesties* faithful Subjects. 3. VVhy not to call upon those whose *Assistance* was so necessary, and who never denied it when demanded? Let us not condemn them before we have all. *Parliaments* (I speak it with due Reverence) are now and then *Peevish* things that will not be satisfied with fair *VVords*, and pry too far into secrets that are not to come to publick view. Our *Grandees* were afraid, if so many clear-sighted men came together; some one or other would spy out the *Snake* that lay in the *Grass*, and if their *Mine* had once taken vent, the whole Design had miscarri'd. No, no, w'l do better (saith the *Cabal*) we'l be wiser than to run that hazard; we are resolved to make *War*, and will not be crossed in it by any *Parliament* Clamours. If for want of a *Parliament*, we can have no *English Subsidies*, we'l make a shift with *French Supplies*: And if that doth not serve the turn (observe the Gradation,) we'l shut up the *Exchequer*. In the mean while the *Smyrna* and *East-India Fleets*, will fall into our hands: And when we have all that *Treasure*; who shall dare to find fault with us?

Having brought the *Cabal* thus far, we must before we part, wait once more on some of them as far as *Holland*, and so take our leave of them.

VVe have already given some account in the first Part of this Discourse, of the new Agreement entered into with the *French King*, by our *Plenipotentiaries*, and demonstrated the fatal consequences of the same; what followeth will clear it farther.

The wonderful *Progress* of the *French* having surprized and frightened all *Europe*: Our *Court* (who knew what slender provision was

made for *England* in that Conquest) was little less Alarm'd than the rest: And our Grand *Ministers* were dispatched in Post haste, both to the *Dutch* and to the *French*, their greatest fear, when they went, being lest they should come too late, and find the whole *Country* under the *French* subjection. After their Arrival at the *Hague*, they began their first Compliments to the *States Commissioners*, that were sent to wait upon them with all the Expressions imaginable, both of kindness to *Holland*, and of concernment and trouble to see the *French* so far advanced. There they received an account of *Monsieur de Groots* Negotiation, and of the great care the *French* took of his Majesty; which raised such an Indignation in them, that nothing would serve their turn, but destroying out of hand, or at least Mastering the *French Fleet*. And from thence removing to the Prince of *Orange* his Camp; they renewed their kind Protestations: Assured his *Majesty*, That his *Majesties* intention had never been to give way to the Conquest of the *United Provinces*: The most *Christian King* himself, having often times declared he only intended to humble their *Commonwealth*, neither was it fit to suffer the *French* should go on at that rate. In the end they took upon them, and engaged to do their utmost to bring the *French Court* to be satisfied with *Mastricht*, and the right of keeping Garrisons in the Towns upon the *Rhine*, that belong to the Electors of *Brandenburg* and *Cologne*. And that in Case the *French* refused to accept of those terms, they would then take new measures with the *States*, and consider jointly of the best ways, to prevent the destruction of their *Commonwealth*, as well as the dangerous encrease of the *French*.

VVith these fair promises and friendly assurances, they proceeded on their Journey to his most *Christian Majesty*, who was some few hours riding from thence; leaving behind them an infinite satisfaction in the minds of all Persons, with great expectation of a happy Conclusion, through their zealous interposition. But what may not the *Royal Encomendation* of a most *Christian King* do? VVhat, will not his *Golden Word* persuade, after our *Grand Ministers* had been some few days in the *French Army*, they found they were not mistaken before, and began to have a clearer apprehension of things. The Negotiation of *De Groote*, with the particulars imparted to them at the *Hague*, was a meer flander; for so the *French Court* told them. The encrease of the *French Power* was not to be suspected or feared; they were too gene-

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rons to abuse it. And therefore after they had left the Prince of *Orange*, three or four days without News from them, they at last sent him word, The *States* were to give satisfaction to both *Kings* joyntly: And that neither *Crown* could or wou'd Treat seperately. This unexpected *Message* did infinitely surprise as well the Prince of *Orange*, as the *States*. And his *Highness* (who had full power given him by the *States* to Treat and conclude with *England*) not to be held longer in suspense, answered the *Plenipotentiaries*, he desired to know what would satisfy both *Crowns*, and what their respective demands were? Whereupon they sent him the joynt *Proposals* before mentioned, together with a Copy of the new Agreement they were entered into; concerning which we'll add only to what hath already been said, these following *Queries*.

1. Whether they were sent only to promote the *French Conquest*; and if not, how they could think it advisable, by making the Peace impossible, to force the *Dutch* (as far as in them lay to cast themselves into the Arms of the *French King*, and submit themselves to his *Dominion*?

2. Whether they can deny they knew the joynt *Proposals* tendred to the *Dutch* should not be granted, since the *French* demands alone had been unanimously rejected, and in that case how agreeable it was to the *Interest* of *England* to make it impossible for the *Dutch* to give his Majesty any satisfaction.

3. Whether, they had not received, as well from the Prince of *Orange*, as from the *States Commissioners*, all possible assurances of the infinite desire they had to see his Majesty to return to his former *Amity* with them, and of their readiness to purchase it, at any rate, that the Condition they were in would bear? If so, how faithfully the *Plenipotentiaries* discharged their trust in neglecting those proffers, and entering into a *New Engagement*, which was so *Prejudicial* to *England*, as we have made it appear?

4. How far those that were joyned in *Commission* with them, did concur with them in their Judgment, and whether all those considerations, with many other, were not represented to them; and urged by some who had no other end, but to serve their *Master* faithfully?

5. Whether or no it was for that Reason, they opposed so fiercely

ly, My Lord *Vicount Hallifax* (who came a day or two after them) his appearing and acting joyntly with them, though *Commissionated* in as full and as ample manner as themselves.

6. VVho were those (after my Lord *Hallifax* could be kept out no longer) who went privately to the *French Camp* under several pretences, and had still *Negotiations* of their own on foot?

7. VVhether they had Order to call the *French King*, the *King of France*, and to name him still before his Master, as well as to set in the first place the *French demands* before those of their *Majesty*; as all this was done in the Copies of the *Agreement* they had made, and of both Kings pretensions which they sent together to the Prince of *Orange* by Sir *Gabriel Sylvius*: And to which we may appeal if the truth of this be doubted?

8. And lastly, How far their Instructions will justify their standing in the behalf of the *French*, upon a *Publick Exercise* of the *Roman Catholick Religion* in the *United Provinces*, the *Churches* to be divided, and the *Romish Priests* maintained out of the *Publick Revenue*? As is set down more at large in the second *Head* of the *French Demands*?

Having thus in a *Uprightness of heart* stated as clearly as I am able the present *Grand case* of the *Nation*, wherein I may truly say before *God* and his *Angels*, I have averred no one thing without good *Vouchers*, (and such respectively) as the nature of the thing doth bear; I'll end with a few *Summary Hints* of what we have discoursed at large, and laying in all *Humility* both my self and these *Reflections*, as well at his *Majesties* as at his *Great Councils Feet*, I beg of them to take into their *Serious considerations*.

1. *The Natural solid Greatness of the French Monarchy.*

2. *Their Ambitious and Aspiring thoughts in all Ages, with the consequences of the same.*

3. *The great increase of their Power under their present King, both by Sea and Land.*

4. *How far it was, not long since, thought fit to stop their Progress; And what stops were made in Order to it, as well as the zeal, with which it was carried on.*

5. *The carriage of the present French Court, and how they have dealt with most Princes of Europe.*

6. *How*

6. How kindly they have used both his Majesty in particular, and the whole Nation

7. How they have been to their word, and to their reiterated promises, and other Engagements.

8. How faithfully they have performed Articles hitherto. And what security we have, they shall be still ready to do worse.

9. The necessity of keeping a true Ballance between the European Princes.

10. How dangerous it is to alter that Ballance, when once settled on a solid Basis.

11. The dreadful consequence of the Conquest of the United Provinces by the French.

12. The impossibility of Conquering them.

13. The Impracticableness or disproportion of the supposed sharing and Division of their Country with the little advantage and benefit which at the best would accrue to us.

14. How prejudicial and hurtful, would to the contrary, any possibility and practicable sharing prove. the same being in truth no other than an absolute French conquest in a disguise.

15. How destructive the present War must needs be in the end, in Case the Dutch shall be enabled by the assistance of their Allies, to recover what they have lost, and to come out with as considerable a Fleet as ours.

16. How considerable the Allies are, and how much Christian Blood will be shed by our wilful adhering to the French.

17. How unavoidable a breach with Spain will be, in case we persist in our Alliance with France.

18. And how fatal the consequence of a Spanish War.

19. How much greater the danger will prove if the French be able to Conquer as with Germany and Spain as the United Provinces, and that no co-fearancy of Princes, how great and how powerful soever, be a sufficient Ballance to their Forces.

20. And lastly, How faithful our Ministers have discharged their Trust in the great Emergences. How free they have been from dependance upon Foreign Courts. How far they have been zealous of their reputation in that particular. What great care they have had of keeping up the Credit and the Reputation of the Triple League, and of their own Masters.

with:

might, Their Backwardne's (not to say worse) in redressing or at least
 declaring against all the wrongs done by the French, as well to his Majesty
 himself as to his Subjects. Their industrious inducements and various
 stratagems to engage his Majesty, and the Nation in this War; their
 Engrossing all business of concernment, and concealing the most Important
 debates and resolutions from his Majesties Privy Council. Nay their
 keeping it unreasonably from his great Council; and putting off their Ses-
 sions till they might cross their designs. Lastly, the carriage of some of
 them in Holland, and of the care they took of the Interest both of England
 of and the Protestant Religion.

Now I call Heaven and Earth to record this day that I have set be-
 fore you Life and Death, Blessing and Cursing; Therefore choose Life,
 that both you and your Seed may Live.

W. J. S.

